









Institutional Change and Ethics Management in the EU’s College of Commissioners

Introduction
A growing theoretical literature on post-formative institutional change has produced various explanations of how institutions, once established, evolve. Recent accounts of change often point to the influential role of endogenous actors; that is, actors based within the institution or regime. The contributions of Thelen (2004), Streeck and Thelen (2005) and, more recently, Mahoney and Thelen (2010), have been crucial to this vein of institutionalist research. The latter provides the most developed theory to date of what the authors call ‘gradual’ institutional change. Informed by this theory, this article seeks to understand how gradual institutional change occurred in the ethics regime for EU Commissioners over the course of the 2000s and what form that change took. The article shows that change involved a layering process, which can be explained through an analysis of the political context and institutional characteristics of the regime, and the actors involved in it. The article contributes theoretically to the literature on institutional change by highlighting the importance of the interplay of internal and external factors, and the crucial role of what is here termed ‘reluctant’ agency.
The empirical focus of this research is the EU’s College of Commissioners. Composed of 27 Members, the College forms the EU’s political executive, setting agendas and taking decisions on the basis of the principle of collective responsibility. As the Commission is the main initiator of European legislation, proposals agreed by the College often provide an important steer for European Union policy and for the European integration process. Despite the prevalent view that the Commission has become substantially weaker since the early 1990s (Peterson 2003; Burns 2004; Kassim and Menon 2010), the College remains a decidedly important body within the EU system of governance. Yet more than a decade after Joana and Smith called the College of Commissioners a ‘black box’ (Joana and Smith 2002), there is still a dearth of literature on this aspect of the European Commission (henceforth ‘Commission’). Whilst recent studies have sought to examine the College at both a general level (Nugent 2001; Spence 2006) and by addressing more specific research questions (for example, Egeberg 2006; Dekker and Sonnicksen 2011; Wonka 2007), very little academic research has been conducted on the rules and norms that govern the conduct of Commissioners (see, however, van Gerven 2000; and Cini 2007). This article contributes to this modest literature by examining the evolution of the Commissioners’ ethics regime. 
 ‘Ethics’ is a concept which is often difficult to pin down. In this article it refers to the appropriate conduct of individuals in a specific situation or context. Thus, an ethics regime is an institution normally comprising structures, rules, processes, norms and principles, designed to influence the conduct of individuals belonging to a profession or an organisation. In the context of public organisations, ethics regimes are often put in place to deal with potential conflicts of interest such as where there is ‘a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities’ (European Parliament 2007, 16).
Inspired by a well-established North American literature (see Menzel 2005 on this), there is now a growing body of research on public ethics in Europe (see Huberts, Maesschalk and Jurkiewicz 2008, by way of example; and Lawton and Doig 2005-6 who review the literature); yet until the early 2000s, no research had been undertaken on the public ethics of the EU institutions. This is a consequence of the absence of any explicit ethics framework at the EU-level. As the European institutions began to take more of an interest in ethics and integrity so too did researchers (see Cini 2007; Demmke, et al. 2007; Dercks 2001; Giusta 2006; Hine and McMahon 2004; Nastase 2012). This literature has primarily focused on the rules governing the Commission administration, though Nastase’s research also deals with the individual attitudes of Commission officials towards ethical issues. Even so, research on public ethics in the EU institutions remains at an embryonic stage in its development, with little published on the European Parliament, the Council or, indeed, on the College of Commissioners.
The research presented in this article contributes to this literature. It takes the form of a single case study. The analytical strategy is one which is theory-informed in a manner which is common to historical institutionalist research; that is, rather than testing key propositions, it uses theory as a guide to empirical exploration and as a means of reflecting on complex processes of change (Hay 2002, 47). The research is largely based on a documentary analysis, drawing on primary sources from the Commission, the European Parliament and NGOs as appropriate. It supplements this analysis by using media sources and a small number of semi-structured interviews with key Commission officials and other Brussels-based actors involved in public ethics. The interviews were conducted in two rounds, in 2006 and 2011. 
The article begins by examining the theoretical literature on institutional change. This is followed by a chronological narrative account of the evolution of the Commissioners’ ethics regime. The penultimate section interrogates this narrative; whilst a short conclusion summarises the empirical findings and draws out some broader theoretical implications of this research. 
Theorising Institutional Change
Although new institutionalist theories have had some success in explaining the effects of institutions on political and policy outcomes, critics have argued that the ‘holy trinity’ of rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Rittberger 2003) provides a relatively feeble account of institutional change. Although ‘institutional change’ sometimes connotes a process which is more revolutionary than evolutionary, here it refers to post-formative change, a synonym of what Pierson (2004, ch. 5) calls ‘institutional development’, and what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identify as ‘gradual institutional change’. This sits in contrast to formative institutional creation or selection, or dramatic institutional change which is transformative and involves the setting up of new institutions. 
Historical institutionalism (HI) provides the point of departure for most analyses of institutional change. Yet many commentators point to the limited ability of HI to explain how institutions, once formed, continue to change (Schmidt 2010; Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 4). Historical institutionalists use the concept of path dependence to show how the past shapes the present, and how the sequencing of decisions over time narrows the scope for action (Schreyögg and Sydow 2010, 4). This can be useful in explaining institutional persistence or inertia, but it does not explain post-formative institutional change. This has provoked institutionalist theorists to devise new ways of addressing this question beyond the conventional focus on external shocks. Increasingly, researchers have pursued research agendas that emphasise endogeneity or agency, or both. The latter points to the role played by ‘change agents’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 22-27) or ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Rao, Morrill and Zald 2000, 240; Levy and Scully 2007). Pierson (2004, 137) identifies the latter as ‘skilled social actors’ who have an interest in developing or changing the institution by leveraging resources, identifying political opportunities, framing issues and mobilizing constituencies. They are also able to make ideas actionable within an institutional setting by means of the discourses they use (Schmidt 2010, 15-17). 
The most developed theory of institutional change to date is set out by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) in their edited book, Explaining Institutional Change. Mahoney and Thelen’s ambition is to explain both the sources and the patterns of gradual institutional change in a unified theory which acknowledges the importance of both political context and institutional characteristics. They posit that different political contexts and institutional characteristics lead to different types of institutional change. They identify four types: displacement (the replacement of old rules by new); layering (the attachment of new rules to old); drift (where the rules stay the same, but their impact changes); and conversion (where the rules stay the same, but they are interpreted and enacted in new ways) (see also Streeck and Thelen 2005). Under the umbrella of ‘political context’, Mahoney and Thelen then explain institutional change as a consequence of the distribution of power within institutions (2010, 14). Changes to the balance of power may be generated internally or externally and reinforced via feedback loops (2010, 10). This might happen, for example, when new environmental conditions emerge (2010, 9) or when a disadvantaged subordinate group within an institution decides to mobilize. Thus the drivers of change may be external or internal. Whilst changes in the balance of power (political context) animate institutional change (2010, 14), institutional characteristics determine whether institutional change can take place. This points to the importance of the degree to which discretion in and/or interpretation of the institutional rules is possibleWhere discretion or interpretation is possible, a ‘gap’ opens up which allows for institutional change (2010, 14). 
In both cases change will only occur where change agents become dominant. The theory goes on to show how different types of change agent are likely to adopt different change strategies and how these result in the different forms of institutional change identified above, though this aspect of the theory is not considered in this article. Whilst this theory of gradual institutional change is primarily designed to offer empirical researchers testable propositions, the theory can also offer interpretive researchers a framework to be used heuristically to facilitate case-study research. Thus, this research draws on the theory of gradual institutional change to generate two research questions: 
	what form has post-formative institutional change taken in the Commissioners’ ethics regime?
	what explains post-formative institutional change in the Commissioners’ ethics regime?
The Evolution of the Commissioners’ Ethics Regime
When Commissioners are appointed they are required to take an oath before the European Court in which they agree to to behave in their new role with integrity and discretion. They also agree to abide by the Treaty rules which make clear  that:
The Members of the Commission shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Member States shall respect their independence and shall not seek to influence them in the performance of their tasks.
The Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn undertaking that, both during and after their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits. In the event of any breach of these obligations, the Court of Justice may, on application by the Council acting by a simple majority or the Commission, rule that the Member concerned be, according to the circumstances, either compulsorily retired in accordance with Article 247 or deprived of his right to a pension or other benefits in its stead (Article 245 TFEU). 
Thus one might argue that there have always been ethics rules for Commissioners. Yet the Treaty framework is vague. It was not until the end of the 1990s that the Commission began to supplement the Treaty, and in so doing establish a fully-fledged ethics regime for Commissioners. The context for this institutional innovation was the resignation of the College of Commissioners in March 1999. This external shock constituted a critical juncture for the Commission, having at its source a shift in the EU’s inter-institutional balance. After gaining new legislative powers in the 1980s and 1990s, the Parliament was increasingly keen to prove itself as a rigorous and effective check on the EU executive. Over the course of the 1990s the two institutions engaged in a power struggle (Judge and Earnshaw 2002). The Commission asserted its right to act independently, whilst the Parliament demanded greater scrutiny over Commission activities and decisions, particularly where there were budgetary implications. By the end of 1998, the relationship between the two institutions had deteriorated to such an extent that a motion of censure, called by the Socialist Group (PES) ostensibly to back the Commission, was supported by a minority large enough (232 to 293) to force the College to accept concessions. The most important of these was the setting up of an investigatory Committee of Independent Experts (CIE). The first of its two reports was published on 15 March 1999, provoking the almost immediate resignation of the College.
The CIE Report raised important questions about the Commission’s culture and internal working practices (CIE 1999a, 9.2; van Gerven 2000). Its most widely publicised elements were those that alleged illegal or inappropriate conduct by Commissioners. The most damning evidence pointed to Edith Cresson, a former French Prime Minister and, latterly, the Commissioner responsible for Research, who was alleged to have appointed her former dentist to an unproductive position in the Commission (European Court 2006). The Cresson case spoke to a fundamental difficulty facing the Commission when addressing ethical issues; that there was no consensus in the Commission on what was and was not considered ethical conduct. The diverse professional as well as national backgrounds of the Commissioners, and the limited opportunities for socialisation within the College meant that attitudes to ethical issues diverged. Moreover the absence of specific guidance beyond the Treaty rules allowed for a discretionary approach on the part of the Commission President. By 1999 this type of self-regulatory approach was judged to have failed.
The weakness of the existing system had already been recognised just prior to the resignation of the Commission. Under pressure from the European Parliament in 1998, Jacques Santer, then Commission President, agreed to draft a series of codes of conduct.  By early 1999, three codes were still being planned; two of them entered the public domain in early March of that year (CIE 1999a, 7.5.2), though these were not formally approved  by the College at this point. The first of these was the Code for Commissioners; the second was a Code on relations between Commissioners and their departments. The third code on the professional conduct of Commission officials proved more difficult to draft, and was dropped in the form originally planned. It is the first of these Codes, however, the Code for Commissioners (or ‘the Code’ hereafter), which is discussed in this article.  
The Code for Commissioners provided modest guidance on payment for speeches and conference attendance; on the involvement of Commissioners in political parties; and on the responsibility of Commissioners to complete declarations of financial interests and assets. It also included rules for missions (business travel) and for receptions and professional representation, as well as on the receipt of gifts, honours and other benefits (Commission 1999a; Hine and McMahon 2004, 27). Yet the Code was judged harshly by the Committee of Independent Experts for including a very limited concept of political responsibility; for allowing Commissioners to engage in unrestricted political activity; and for its minimalist approach to issues such as gifts and the interests of family members (CIE 1999a, 7.5.3-13; Dercks 2001, 350). 
The Code was also criticised for failing to address the ‘revolving doors’ issue (Hine and McMahon 2004, 27). This post-employment (or post term-of-office) question became especially pertinent for the incoming Commission President, Romano Prodi, as a media storm blew up around the early departure from office in July 1999 of the German Industry Commissioner, Martin Bangemann. Bangemann had taken a position in the Spanish telecommunications company, Telefonica, a move which raised a potential conflict of interest given the proximity of his new role to his old portfolio (Cini 2007, 112-3; BBC News 1 July 1999). As soon as Bangemann’s departure was announced in mid-July, the Commission rushed to revise the Code, completing a draft in a matter of days before a parliamentary debate.However, the European Parliament and an increasingly active NGO, Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), continued to put pressure on the Commission to extend its scope (European Parliament 1999; CEO 2000). However, changes to the earlier draft of the Code were modest. 
The Code now included a one-year ‘cooling down’ period when Commissioners were expected to seek approval from the Commission President if they wanted to engage in any employment connected with their former portfolio. There was also an important innovation in the form of the setting up of an ad hoc Ethical (or Ethics) Committee to offer advice on difficult post-employment cases towards the end of the Commission’s term. This was to comprise three individuals, nominated by the Commission President, and with good knowledge of the workings of the Commission, who could provide advice to the President on specific cases when asked to do so. The first Ethical Committee was set up in 2003, and it has been reconvened at the close of each Commission term since. As of 2010, the members of the Committee were Michel Petite, Terry Wynn and Rafael García-Valdecasas. The Committee has been subject to criticism as it works to criteria which are not publicly available; neither are correspondance nor minutes in the public domain.
The Code for Commissioners was approved by the new College in September 1999 (Commission 1999b). The Code sat, at this point, within a much wider reform context which aimed to modernise the Commission’s administration. But neither the approval of the Code nor the initiation of an administrative reform prevented Commissioners from facing an almost weekly barrage of criticism in the media during Prodi’s term as Commission President. A particularly virulent channel for attacks of this kind involved Marta Andreasen, the newly appointed Chief Accountant, who in 2002 complained in a very public way about serious problems in the Commission’s accounting system, and who had been suspended as a consequence (Andreasen 2004; European Voice  5 September 2002). MEPs, insensed by this, threatened to block Commissioners’ pay and expenses  and the European media carried frequent articles condemning the Commission’s treatment of Andreasen and its response to criticism (The Telegraph 4 August 2002). 
A further wave of media attacks began in mid-2003 as a consequence of the complex Eurostat affair in which officials in the EU’s Statistical Office were alleged to have set up illicit bank accounts into which Community funds had been deposited (Cini 2007, 81-107). Whilst this case primarily involved Commission officials, it raised important questions about political responsibility in the College, illustrated by Commissioner Pedro Solbes’ claim at the time that he could not be held responsible for things about which he did not know (BBC News 24 September 2003). The Prodi Commission’s rather clumsy treatment of whistle-blowers was highlighted in both the Andreasen case, and in the case of a Eurostat employee, Dorte Schmidt-Brown, who had been treated badly by the Commission leadership when she tried to blow the whistle on illicit activities in Eurostat as early as 2000 (FT Observer 14 October 2004). The Parliament called Commissioners to account over these issues (RCC 2006), though its criticism was directed as much at the way in which Commission had responded to accusations as to the accusations themselves. There was little sympathy for Neil Kinnock, the Vice-President of the Commission responsible for administrative reform, when he claimed before the Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee that the Commission could be attacked with impunity, but was never allowed to disprove allegations made against it (European Voice 18 September 2002).
Ultimately the Commission did admit that mistakes had been made. This led the Commission to make efforts to improve relations between Commissioners and senior officials (Commission 2009b, footnote 2). It also prompted the setting up of an Ethics (or Déontolgie) Unit within the Commission’s Secretariat-General (Interview 2), as a response to concerns in the College that Commissioners were not being kept informed of potentially controversial ethical issues in the Commission’s services (Commission 2004a, 15; Interview 2). Since 2005, the Ethics Unit has been responsible for coordinating on ethics issues across the Commission, liaising with the Human Resources DG, and IDOC, the Commission’s internal disciplinary body, and other organisations including the EU’s anti-fraud office, OLAF. The Unit is particularly responsible for coordinating with the Secretary-General on ethics-related matters, to ensure that Commissioners are well informed of any impending issues. It also prepares awareness and information packages for new Members of the Commission, and reminds outgoing Commissioners of their post-employment obligations (Commission 2009b, 7, footnote 9; Interviews 2 and 4). 
The Eurostat affair also provided the context for another round of revisions to the Code for Commissioners (Commission 2004a; Kinnock 2003). To guarantee parliamentary support for his nomination as President in 2004, José-Manuel Barroso had been persuaded to commit to such a change (Interview 1). It had also been agreed that the Parliament would provide an opinion on a draft version of the Code (European Parliament 2004). The revisions went further than previous versions in detailing the conditions under which and the procedure by which Commissioners could participate in election campaigns or stand for political office. There was a new clause which stated that Commissioners must agree to resign if requested to do so by the President (Commission 2004b, 1.2.1). There was more detail on the requirement that Commissioners complete a Declaration of Financial Interests at the start of their term with updates each year, as the Declaration had not been well implemented in the previous term (Interview 3). In addition, there was now clarification of the procedure on gifts over €150, and a commitment to publish this information in future on the Commission’s website. Once again there was no wholescale rewriting of the Code; rather, the revisions involved a further detailing of existing provisions, with the introduction of a small number of new elements which had been raised as criticisms during the College’s previous term of office. 
José-Manuel Barroso’s first test as Commission President came as a consequence of his support for Italian Commissioner-elect, Rocco Buttiglione. Buttiglione faced criticism from some quarters in the Parliament for espousing arguments in his parliamentary hearing which some MEPs felt were homophobic. He was ultimately withdrawn as Commissioner, but only after the Parliament threatened to reject the College, placing substantial pressure on Barroso. This was not the only ethics-related issue Barroso had to address early-on however (BBC News 11 October 2004). One Commissioner-elect had failed to declare a criminal conviction (BBC News 24 November 2004); and another, Neelie Kroes, was deemed by the Parliament to have business interests that raised conflicts of interest. As a consequence of this latter case Barroso agreed that individual Commissioners could in future develop their own specific ethics rules to supplement those in the Code (Commission 2004c; Interview 4). Kroes’ initiatives on this front have since meant that the ethics rules applying specifically to competition policy have since become a model of best practice within the Commission (Interview 5).
Barroso himself was not immune to criticism over potential conflicts of interest. His participation in the Portuguese general election campaign in February 2005 (The Independent 17 February 2005) was criticised; and his holiday in August 2004 on a yacht owned by a Greek ship-owner friend who had received EU aid also hit the headlines (Die Welt 19 April 2005). Even though the conflict of interest in this latter case was more potential than actual (Interview 1), Barroso agreed to distance himself from all decisions on competition policy, including those involving the shipping industry. This case also brought to light the broader issue of the President’s untenable position in assessing his own conduct under the Code. Although he is able to delegate this task to another Commissioner (Commission 2009b, 4), this reawakened Commission interest in the idea of an inter-institutional body which might advise the EU institutions on ethical issues. Nothing came of this however because of opposition within the European Parliament. An earlier and similar proposal in the Commission’s 2000 White Paper on Reform had also been stymied by the Parliament back in 2001 (Commission 2000, 2009b).  
At the start of Barroso’s first term and in the context of the European Transparency Initiative (ETI), initiated in 2005 by Commissioner Siim Kallas, Commission ‘ethics’ was to be reevaluated. The main focus of this aspect of the ETI was the Commission’s administrative wing rather than the College (see Commission 2008). However, a comparative research project was commissioned by the Commission’s in-house think tank, BEPA in 2007; and the report it produced (Demmke et al 2007d) was used to defend the Commission’s rather minimalist approach to ethics reform in the College (Commission 2009b). The report was also said to inform the next round of revisions to the Code in 2011.
The Parliament once again put pressure on the Commission President as his first term of office came to a close, arguing that he should revise the Code again. Indeed even as early as 2007 the Parliament had called for a further revision, though at that point the President responded by saying that it was too early to consider such a request (Commission 2009b, 3). As Barroso’s first term ended however, the likely post-employment activities of certain Commissioners began to force the Commission President’s hand. In one case, Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, on the advice of the Ethical Committee, was required to decline a non-executive directorship that he had planned to take after leaving his post (European Voice 8 October 2010). Commissioner Gunther Verheugen’s lobby consultancy firm, though earlier approved by the President, was also condemned in the media (Euractiv 14 May 2010). 
At first Barroso resisted parliamentary pressure, arguing that any further review should lead to an inter-institutional agreement, a line he had taken since 2005 (Commission 2009b, 5). However, Parliament rejected these overtures, egged on by a campaign orchestrated by ALTER-EU (ALTER-EU 2011). This umbrella group, which lobbies for greater lobbying transparency and ethics in the EU was extremely active, organising briefings, writing position papers and liaising with journalists and MEPs. Yet even ALTER-EU did not recommend an overhaul of the Commissioners’ ethics regime, but rather focused on proposing incremental changes to the existing framework, with an emphasis on the ‘revolving door’ issue and extending the remit of the Ethical Committee (ALTER-EU 2011). This meant that it could conduct a targetted and effective campaign within its limited means (Interview 7).
Having decided to stand for re-election as President of the Commission, Barroso finally gave in. He agreed to revise the Code and consult with the Parliament (European Parliament 2011; Interview 3). However, once appointed, inaction on the part of the Barroso II Commission, which seemed to be moving at a ‘snail’s pace’ (European Voice 30 September 2010), led the Parliament to threaten to withhold part of the Commission’s budget until the commitment to redraft the Code was honoured. It was only in late 2010 that a revised draft Code appeared, though some parliamentarians were annoyed that consultation was to be with the Parliament’s Conference of Presidents and Political Groups behind closed doors rather than with the Budgetary Control Committee (COCOBU) which normally took responsibility for ethics-related issues (Interview 3). Indeed, COCOBU had even identified a rapporteur for this job, assuming that it would have a chance to debate and vote on the Code (Interview 7). It was only able to have sight of the draft Code when it was leaked to ALTER-EU in December 2010. 
The revised Code that was finally agreed in April 2011 once again added a further layer of rules onto those existing in its previous incarnations (Commission 2011). The revisions extended from 12 to 18 months the period during which former Commissioners had to notify the Commission of their post-employment activities. It extended the remit of the Ethical Committee, allowing it to consider, if requested, any issue relating to the interpretation of the Code. (Interview 3; Commission 2009b, 6). This version of the Code also prevented family members from working for Commissioners’ cabinets, and made some other minor modifications to the regime (Commission 2011). Whilst these changes were less extensive than the Parliament and ALTER-EU had hoped for, they marked yet another gradual change in the evolution of the Commissioners’ ethics regime.
Explaining Institutional Change in the Commissioners’ Ethics Regime
From this narrative account it is clear that the Commissioners’ ethics regime has evolved through a process identified by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) as ‘layering’. This is the form that institutional change has taken since the late 1990s.  Revisions to the ethics regime in 2004 and 2011 were not transformative, but rather layered change upon change in two ways; first, by detailing aspects of the regime already referred to explicitly in the Treaty and/or Code; and second, by introducing new elements into the Code in response to salient issues that had been criticised by Parliament and CEO/ALTER-EU and discussed in the media.
To understand how this process of change came about, it is useful to return to Mahoney and Thelen (2010)’s theory in which they identify political context and institutional characteristics as drivers of gradual institutional change. It is impossible to understand the evolution of the Commissioners’ ethics regime without an account of the political context within which the Commission was operating in the 2000s. The early 1990s had marked the end of the European ‘permissive consensus’ and as a consequence increasing attention began to be paid to participatory governance in the European Union. As a response to disappointing referendum results and declining voter turnout in European Parliament elections, the EU institutions, concerned about Europe’s democratic deficit, identified new channels for giving citizens and their representatives a greater voice in EU decision-making, whilst at the same time demonstrating the relevance of EU policy to ordinary people. With an eye to enhancing the legitimacy of the EU institutions, greater transparency in the EU policy process seemed a prerequisite for such change. Indeed, journalists and civil society organisations demanded that institutions such as the Commission (Hooghe 2012) open up to greater scrutiny. 
At the same time, the European Parliament’s confidence was growing. Whilst the introduction of the cooperation and then the codecision (now ‘ordinary legislative’) procedure gradually enhanced the Parliament’s decision-making capacity, more attention was also paid to its scrutiny functions. The Parliament increasingly took advantage of its formal powers and a growing moral authority vis-à-vis the Commission, to call the latter to account. This change was accentuated by the events surrounding the resignation of the Commission in 1999. At the same time, national governments used the Commission as a scapegoat for unpopular policies at home, reinforcing the inter-institutional redistribution of power. In sum, the Commission’s position within the EU system changed from the 1990s. This was no overnight transformation, but part of a gradual process which saw the emergence of a weaker Commission and a stronger European Parliament. In response, the Commission sought to reinvent itself as a modern organisation. Modernity was pursued through reform, one element of which was the introduction of ethics regimes for the Commission’s officials and, as discussed in this article, for its Commissioners. 
The redistribution of power within the EU, particularly between the Commission and Parliament, did not alter the fact that it was the Commission that decided whether or not to revise its ethics regime. Parliament could (and did) seek to put pressure on the College, but reform (of the Commission’s internal rules) continued to be a matter for the Commission itself. When the Code came under review, it was discussed internally and only reluctantly released in draft form to the wider EU community. The prevailing view in the Commission was that the Code was an internal document (Interview 4). But even if the aim was to provide more detailed guidance for Commissioners, the Code remained a short document, itself open to interpretation. It was the responsibility of the President of the Commission to apply (and interpret) the Code as he saw fit. This could involve negotiation and informal discussion with Commissioners who appeared to have breached the Code and would normally involve discussion with the Secretary-General or those officials based in the Secretariat-General’s Ethics Unit. Ultimately however the decision remains with the President.
While the Parliament has been keen to have more control over the Commission’s internal rules, the use of a Code and the decision not to develop hard (legally-enforceable) rules has never been contested, not least as codes are frequently the instrument of choice within ethics regimes. The initial decision to use this instrument was taken by Jacques Santer in the 1990s; and this has suited the Commission as it continues to give the Commission President discretion over its revision and application. The Code has spawned Declarations on Financial Interests and on Gifts of more than €150, and a new institutional framework has been set up within the Commission. There is also some modest awareness-raising and training now for Commissioners at the start of and throughout their term of office. However, the logic of change remains the same; that is, that codes (using soft law) simply expand upon and interpret what already exists in the Treaty. Parliament has never contested the use of a Code in this context. It has only sought to increase the scope of the instrument, tighten up its application, and seek influence over its approval.
The political context and the institutional framework go some way towards explaining how institutional change came about within the ethics regime for Commissioners. Yet a more complete account also demands a focus on agency. The key agents are (actors within) the European Parliament, the NGOs, CEO and ALTER-EU and the Commission itself. Only the Parliament and the NGOs are judged to be change agents however. In the case of Parliament, the changed political context meant that MEPs, especially those in COCOBU, felt a responsibility to keep the Commission in check, calling the Commission President and Commissioners to account. It is no coincidence that institutional change coincided with the arrival of a new Parliament, and the imminent appointment of a new Commission in both 2004 and 2011. It is at this point in the EU’s political cycle that Parliament has most control over the Commission President. Prodi realised, for example, that his mandate in the Commission was a reform mandate, and as such that he had little option but to respond to Parliament’s demands that the Codes be revised. Although the context had changed by 2004, Barroso’s early involvement in the Buttiglione affair forced him to recognise the political and moral power of the Parliament, making him particularly attentive to parliamentary concerns.
Both CEO and ALTER-EU have been a constant thorn in the side of the Commission over ethics-related issues. They have lobbied hard over the reform of the ethics regime, though as a relatively small coalition with limited resources, their impact has been targetted at particular issues on particular occasions. Pro-reform parliamentarians have worked closely with ALTER-EU building up an external alliance in support of extending the ethics regime for EU Commissioners. Even if it is the Commission that decides whether it wishes to engage in institutional reform of this kind, the moral pressure arising out of the changed political context in which the Commission finds itself means that it finds it hard to resist the compelling arguments for reform advanced by these external change agents.
Turning to the Commission, decisions about the ethics regime in the College have been conceived of as a form of risk management. The Commission’s risk-averse tendencies are clearly stated in their documentation, where they explain the ethics regime’s value in terms of the reputation and legitimacy of the Commission (see, for example, Commission 1999b). Whilst the Commission tended to hold defensive postures in the past, in the post-1999 political environment this kind of approach caused more problems than it solved. A more receptive and responsive stance and tone has since been exercised with respect to the demands of parliamentarians, civil society and indeed the media. Responsiveness is not the same as change agency however. There is no evidence of the Commission initiating change with regard to the Commissioners’ ethics regime. The changes it has made can on the whole be traced to specific demands made by external actors rather than to any home-grown reflection. Even the comparative research project commissioned in 2007 was used to justify the status quo, rather than to engage in any ‘blue-sky’ thinking on ethics. The conclusion one draws, then, is of an institution far from enthusiastic about reform but conscious of the need to respond to actors within its environment. 
Conclusion
This article has charted and analysed the evolution of the EU Commissioners’ ethics regime since 1999. It addressed two questions: what form did institutional change take?; and what explains change in the period after 1999? In answering both questions, the research was informed by Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change. 
In response to the first question, identifying the form that change took was relatively straightforward, as the empirical account above shows that change was incremental, involving a process of layering of reform upon reform. Explaining the Commissioners’ ethics regime was more complex, however, as it involved an analysis of the political context shaping the regime, the institutional characteristics permitting change, and the role of agents both external and internal to the regime. Thus this research has highlighted: the redistribution of power across the EU which restricted the Commission’s ability to act autonomously in deciding its own rules of ethics, allowing external actors to become dominant change agents; an institutional framework which placed formal decision-making in ethics in the hands of the Commission alone; a risk-averse Commission, which demonstrates little enthusiasm or interest in further developing its ethics regime; and as a consequence, an ethics regime which changed only gradually over time, primarily in response to outside pressures, but also and importantly as a consequence of internal reluctance to reform. What, then, are the theoretical implications of this empirical finding?
First, the article shows the importance of keeping an open mind when examining the sources of institutional change. Whilst endogenous accounts of change are fashionable, exogenous factors may still be important, if not crucial, in cases of gradual institutional change. The case examined above provides a useful reminder that change often comes about not as a consequence of either internal or external factors, but of the interplay between the two.
Second, the article demonstrates the usefulness of Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change, and shows the potential of new theories which focus on agency and endogenous influences to go beyond what are sometimes rather one-dimensional explanations of change which tend to overstate the importance of external shocks. More specifically, Mahoney and Thelen’s typology of gradual institutional change works well in pinpointing the type of change identified in the empirical case examined in this article. The theory also offers a useful heuristic or conceptual framework - in the form of political context, institutional characteristics and change agency - which works well as a frame for undertaking interpretive analysis, even if this is not its prime objective. 
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